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1. Introduction 
On average, women are less likely to become self-employed, earn less and work 
fewer hours than men. While a vast literature has investigated the extent to which these 
gaps can be explained by differences in human capital, a more recent effort has found 
that noncognitive skills such as emotional stability, conscientiousness and aggression or 
antagonism can explain some of the pay differences between men and women (Mueller 
and Plug, 2006). 
Numerous studies have found that women are more risk averse than men (e.g., 
Barsky et al., 1997; Hartog et al., 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Borghans et al., 
2009; Croson and Gneezy, 2009).  Recent experimental studies found that women do 
not perform as well as men in competitive environments (Gneezy et al., 2003; Niederle 
and Vesterlund, 2007; Croson and Cneezy, 2009).  One might presume that gender 
differences in labor market outcomes would be partially explained by such differences 
as well.  
In fact, risk preferences are commonly found to have a significant role in 
determining entry into self-employment for men(Van Praag and Cramer, 2001; Hartog 
et al., 2002; Cramer et al., 2002; Ekelund et al., 2005; Kan and Tsai, 2006; Ahn, 2009).  
Bonin et al. (2007) find that the least risk averse individuals select occupations with 
higher wages and higher variation in wages.  It is tempting to presume that women’s 
greater aversion to risk and competition explains women’s lower wages and lower rate 
of entrepreneurship, as suggested by Croson and Gneezy (2009).  However, that link 
has not yet been established empirically.  To date, most studies of labor market 
outcomes tied to risk preferences have relied either on cross sectional data sets of men 
only or of pooled samples that do not estimate separate effects of risk preferences 
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across genders.   
The exception is a study of the gender wage gap in Australia by Le et al. (2010)  
which found that favorable attitudes toward financial risk raises earnings for both men 
and women.  However, gender differences in risk attitudes explain only a small part of 
the gender pay gap.  To our knowledge, no previous study has investigated the extent 
to which risk preferences explain gender gaps in occupational choice or labor supply.  
This study examines the role of risk preferences in explaining observed gender gaps in 
entrepreneurship, earnings and hours worked in the 1979 National Longitudinal 
Surveys of Youth.  
Consistent with the earlier studies, we find that less risk averse men are more 
likely to enter self-employment.  However, we find no significant effect of risk 
attitudes on women’s entrepreneurship.  The role of risk aversion also differs by 
gender across employment type.  In self-employment, less risk aversion is associated 
with lower male earnings, but risk aversion has no effect on female earnings.  In paid-
employment, less risk aversion lowers male wage whereas it raises female wage.  
Finally, we find no relationship between risk aversion and hours of labor for both men 
and women.  Consequently, a standard decomposition shows that gender differences 
in risk attitudes explain only a small fraction of the gender gap in self-employment.  
Similarly, those differences in risk aversion between men and women account for only 
a trivial portion of the gender gap in earnings and hours worked.  
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes conceptual 
frameworks for the relationship between risk aversion and occupational choice, 
earnings, and work effort in hours.  In section 3, empirical methodology and data are 
discussed.  In the subsection, the measures of individual risk attitudes are briefly 
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summarized.   Section 4 shows empirical results, along with results of the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition for both non-linear and linear models.  The following 
subsection shows results of sensitivity analysis.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual framework: Choosing occupation, earnings and hours of labor 
This section shows that in theory, risk preferences should affect individual 
decisions regarding labor force entry, occupation and earnings conditional on entry, and 
hours of work.  Consequently, differences in risk preferences between men and 
women potentially could explain some of the gender differences in these choices. 
Individuals are assumed to choose one of three employment types: self-
employment, paid employment, or being out of labor force so as to maximize expected 
utility.  Utility depends on expected pecuniary returns from market work and utility 
from nonmarket work or leisure.  Utility is concave in earnings so that it can reflect an 
individual’s risk aversion.  Individuals form their beliefs of future earnings based on 
their human capital which contributes to his/her productivity at home or on the job.  
The reduced form utility function from an individual i choosing an employment type j 
is given by 
( , , , )ij ij ij iL iU F e y μ θ=                                               (1) 
( )ij miy f X=                                                     (2) 
( , )iL mi hif X Xμ =                                                 (3) 
where ije is work effort in j occupation (i.e., fraction of time spent in j); ijy~  denotes 
expected future earnings in  j which is a function of miX : the human capital that 
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affects ability in the market; iLμ is known utility from nonmarket work which is 
determined by miX  and factors that influence productivity in home production, hiX ; 
and iθ  denotes a measure of i’s risk aversion.   
  Following Barsky et al. (1997) and Kimball et al. (2008), we assume that 
individuals have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).  The associated utility 
function from employment type j is given by:  
1( )
(1 )
1
i
ij
ij ij ij iL ij
i
y
U e e
θ
μ εθ
−
= + − +−

, θ്1                               (4) 
where 
( )
0
( )
ij ij
i
ij
y U y
U y
θ ′′−= >′
 
   is the Arrow-Pratt measure of the coefficient of individual 
i’s relative risk aversion; (1-eij) denotes fraction of time spent in the home; iε  is an 
error term which captures unobservable factors such as motivation and preferences for 
job attributes.   
In order to derive expected utility with respect to future earnings, we take a 
second order Taylor series expansion around the mean of future earnings ( y~μ ).  For 
simplicity, the subscripts i and j are suppressed: 
21( ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (( ) )
2y y y y y
E U y U U E y U E yμ μ μ μ μ ω′ ′′≈ + − + − +         
       21( ) ( )
2y y y
U Uμ μ σ ω′′= + +                                    (5)               
where )~(~ yEy =μ , )~(2~ yVary =σ , and ω is a random error due to approximation. 
The first and second order partial derivatives of the equation (4) with respect to 
y~ are respectively: 
( ) ( )U y e y θ−′ =   
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1( ) ( )U y e y θθ − −′′ = −                                                (6) 
Plugging equations (4) and (6) into equation (5) yields  
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An individual optimally allocates time between market work and nonmarket 
work by maximizing his expected utility with respect to work effort, e.  The first order 
condition is given by (8) 
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Equations (9), (10), and (11) show that if expected utility from earnings in the 
market at any positive e equals utility from nonmarket work or leisure, an agent 
allocates his available time between market work and nonmarket work ( * 0e > );  
Otherwise he will specialize in home production ( *e =0) or market production ( *e =1).  
Clearly, a decision on whether to enter the labor market depends on risk attitudes, 
human capital, and household characteristics so that * ( , , )m he e X Xθ= .   
In addition, if we presume that the utility from time out of the labor force is 
positive ( 0Lμ > ) then an interior solution where 0<e<1 requires that 
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.1  For the rest of our analysis, we will presume that 
for individuals in the labor market, 0 < θ < 1.   
Assuming e>0, an individual chooses self-employment if expected utility from 
selecting self-employment exceeds that from paid-employment: 
0 0| |s ws e w eEU EU> >>   
Manipulating expected utility yields the following condition for entering self-
employment: 
2 2
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 
 
 
 (12) 
where subscripts s and w denote self-employment and paid-employment, respectively. 
We presume that self-employment is a riskier occupation than paid-employment.  
That means that the coefficient of variation (CV) for self-employed earnings is larger 
than the CV for salaries in paid-employment:  , ,
, ,
y s y w
s w
y s y w
CV CV
σ σ
μ μ= > = .  
The condition CVs>CVw implies that the bracket in the first term on the left 
hand side of (12) is smaller than the bracketed term on the right hand side.  Hence, 
other things equal, expected return from self-employment needs to be higher than that 
                                                     
1 The theoretical models of Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and Newbery and Stiglitz (1982) assumed 
relative risk aversion is less than one. However, empirical estimates of the relative risk aversion 
coefficient are often larger than one.  For examples, Hansen and Singleton (1983) find relative risk 
aversion in the range from 0 to 2 whereas Pålsson (1996) finds it in the range between 2 and 4.  
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from paid-employment in order for any risk averse individual to enter self-employment: 
, ,y s y wμ μ>  .   
We are interested in assessing how increases in risk aversion affect the expected 
return from occupational choice at a fixed level of work effort.  Figure 1 illustrates 
how expected utility from market work in each occupation changes as risk aversion 
increases.   Graphs display various conditions on , ,,y s y wμ μ  , CVs, and CVw.    As 
shown in Figure 1, as θ increases, expected utility from market work decreases in both 
self-employment and paid-employment.  However, expected utility declines faster in 
self-employment than paid-employment and so paid employment becomes more 
attractive as θ increases.  This evidence suggests that more risk averse agents who 
nevertheless choose self-employment will require a higher expected return from self-
employment, and so ,y sμ  must increase in θ.  The reverse is true for the effect of θ on 
expected earnings in paid employment: a more risk averse individual requires lower 
expected return than their less risk averse counterparts when they choose paid-
employment.  See the Appendix 1 for the proof.   
Risk aversion has an ambiguous effect on work effort, whether in self-
employment (es) or wage work (ew).  The reason is that effort depends on the utility 
from nonmarket work.  Assuming 0 < e < 1, more risk averse individuals who receive 
high utility from nonmarket work or leisure will reduce work effort in the market 
production because increases in θ decrease utility from market work at any level of 
expected earnings.  The reverse is true for those who have low utility from nonmarket 
work: more risk aversion increases market work effort in order to scale up the 
decreased utility from market work.  See the Appendix 2 for the derivation. 
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We have shown that in reduced form, individual decisions on labor force 
participation, occupational choice, earnings, and work effort will depend on the 
individual’s degree of risk aversion as well as on predetermined skills in market and 
nonmarket production.  Given the frequently reported finding that women are more 
risk averse than men, it is natural to presume that gender differences in risk preferences 
would play a role in explaining widely observed gender gaps in these labor market 
outcomes.  Accordingly, this paper will examine the extent to which differences in 
measured risk aversion between men and women can explain differences between the 
sexes in labor force participation, entrepreneurial entry, earnings, and hours worked.  
 
3. Empirical methodology and data 
3.1 Methodology 
To examine the influence of risk aversion on occupational choice, we employ a 
multinomial logit model using a random utility model approach.  We run separate 
estimations for men and women for an appropriate comparison of the two groups.  
The predicted probability that an individual i chooses employment mode j is 
given by 
 
3
1
1 1 2 3I Iij i i j i j i k i k i
k
Pr( C | , X ) exp( X ) exp( X ), j , ,θ δ θ β δ θ β
=
′ ′= = + + =∑     (13) 
where j=1 for self-employment, 2 for paid-employment and 3 for out of labor force; the 
superscript I indicates an estimate of categorical risk attitude index; and θi is a 
categorical variable indicating attitudes toward risk with higher levels indicating greater 
acceptance of risk.  Our primary interest is in establishing the sign and significance of 
the coefficient on risk attitude, Ijδ .  We also include a vector Xi  that contains 
controls for heterogeneity in tastes and skills including wealth, total number of children, 
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presence of preschool or school age child (age 0~6, 7~12), marital status, education, 
labor market experience, health condition, parental education and occupational 
background,  and other demographic variables such as age and four regions. 
As an alternative specification, we replace θi  by three dummy variables Dli, l 
=2, 3, 4; indicating progressively lower levels of risk aversion with unwillingness to 
take on any risk as the reference category ( 1=l ). The associated predicted probability 
that individual i chooses employment mode j is given by 
)exp()exp(),|1Pr(
3
1
4
2
4
2
∑ ∑∑
= ==
′+′+==
k
ikli
l
D
lkij
l
li
D
ljij XDXDXDC βδβδ      (14) 
Next, we want to explore the extent to which differences in risk preferences 
explain differences in earnings and hours worked by gender.  As men and women will 
be selecting hours and wages at the same time they are selecting occupation, those 
decisions will be subject to the same human capital and socio-demographic factors.  
ln g Iik k i k i k i ik i k ikY Z Xδ θ α γ λ ε α ε′= + + + ≡ +                           (15)               
ln g Iik k i k i k i ik i k ikh Z Xδ θ α γ λ ε ψ ε′= + + + ≡ +     , k=s, w;  g=m, f            (16) 
where k=s for self-employment, w for paid-employment; g=m for male and f for female; 
vector Z contains the same variables as those in X except wealth and parental 
occupational background.  We only observe earnings and hours of work conditional 
on labor market entry, and so the earnings and labor supply equations also include a 
correction 
( )
( )
i k
ik
i k
z
z
φ ηλ η= Φ  for sample selection bias based on the procedure by 
Heckman (1976, 1979).  The zi  augments vector Xi with risk aversion θi.   
 
3.2 Data and Sample selection 
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The data source for the analysis is drawn from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth 79 (NLSY79) for the period between 1993 and 2002.  The NLSY79 includes 
12,686 individuals who were 14-22 years old in the initial survey year.  6,933 
individuals aged between 28 and 45 were interviewed during the observation periods.  
Employment type is identified by using "class of worker" category, which indicates 
whether a respondent was employed by a private sector or government or was self-
employed.  We classify those who ever started a business in the period between 1994 
and 2002 as self-employed.  Hence, self-employment is identified using a 9-year 
longitudinal horizon to reflect long-term planning horizon that we presume applies to 
occupational choice.  As a consequence, in our data, the decision to become self-
employed is made between ages 29 and 45.  Schiller and Crewson (1997) also 
suggested that a longer life-cycle view for entrepreneurs would be preferred in the sense 
that new entrepreneurs may emerge in later years.   
Those who never have a spell of self-employment but did work for pay were 
placed in the wage worker category over the 9 years time window.  Respondents that 
did not report at least one employment spell over the period are considered out of the 
labor force.   
Earnings are measured by the hourly pay rate.  Although total annual earnings 
from wage and/or business in the previous calendar year can be identified in NLSY79, 
there are many missing values for self-employment earnings.  Roughly 50 percent of 
the self-employed reported zero business earnings and about 11 percent of the self-
employed with positive total annual earnings report zero income.2 This may be due to 
                                                     
2 NLSY79 asked respondents a question of “Did you receive earnings from business or farm in the past 
year?” In the following question, they were asked “what are total annual earnings from business or farm 
in the past calendar year?” In our data, 11% of respondents who answered ‘yes’ to the question over the 
observation years actually reported zero earnings.  
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self-employed reporting their income as wage or salary income (Fairlie, 2005).  
Because of the low response rate for the total annual business earnings, we incorporate 
earnings measured by hourly pay rate.  For example, if a respondent identified himself 
as self-employed and reported hourly pay rate, we treat the self-reported hourly pay rate 
as self-employment hourly earnings.  Because the observation time is between 1994 
and 2002, we average their earnings over the years.  Earnings are deflated by the CPI-
U in 2002 dollars.  Hours worked per week are also averaged over the years.  
We drop those who were in military service or in school.  We also drop 
individuals for whom critical information is missing.  Finally, we exclude individuals 
who were already self-employed in 1993 to avoid reverse causal effects of experience 
of business ownership on risk attitudes.  Therefore, the risk preference is measured 
before the spell of self-employment is initiated.   The final sample includes 5,443 
individuals; 2,662 males and 2,781 females.  
The distributions of employment type by gender over the period between 1994 
and 2002 are summarized in Table 1.  The longer time period eliminates most of the 
differences in labor force participation between men and women.  Only 6 % of women 
and 3% of men were never employed over the 9 years.  As shown, self-employment 
entry rate for women (13%) is lower than that for men (16%).  Likewise, the 
proportion of male wage workers (82%) is slightly larger than that for females (80%).  
A summary of self-employment rates, log hourly earnings and log hours worked across 
employment types by gender are reported in Table 2.3  Women earn less than men and 
they also work fewer hours than men regardless of employment type.  These 
                                                     
3 Distribution graphs are also provided in Appendix 6. 
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differences in self-employment, earnings and labor supply between men and women are 
statistically significant, consistent with what has been found in the previous literature.   
Definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are 
reported separately by gender in Table 3. 
 
3.3 Measures of risk attitudes 
The willingness to take financial risk is measured by a categorical variable with 
four levels.  In the 1993 NLSY79, respondents were asked the following questions: 
(Q1) Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, and you have a good job guaranteed to 
give you your current (family) income every year for life. You are given the opportunity to take a new 
and equally good job, with a 50-50 chance that it will double your (family) income and a 50-50 chance 
that it will cut your (family) income by a third. Would you take the new job? 
 
The individuals who answered ‘yes’ to this question were then asked:  
(Q2) suppose the chances were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it would 
cut it in half. Would you still take the new job? Those who answered ‘no’ to the first question (Q1) then 
asked: (Q3) suppose the changes were 50-50 that it would double your (family) income and 50-50 that it 
would cut it by 20 percent. Would you take the new job? 
 
We use the responses to the series of questions in order to place each respondent 
into one of four risk categories (1-4). The four risk index categories, ranging from the 
most risk averse (category1) to the least risk averse (category4), are as followed: 
1
2
3
4
riskindex
⎧⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎩ if
if
if
if
YesQ
YesQ
NoQ
NoQ
=
=
=
=
1
1
1
1
&
&
&
&
YesQ
NoQ
YesQ
NoQ
=
=
=
=
2
2
3
3
;
;
;
;
accept
accept
reject
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cut
cut
cut
cut
31
31
31
31
&
&
&
&
accept
reject
accept
reject
cut
cut
cut
cut
21
21
51
51
 
In order to test for a monotonic relationship between a labor market outcome 
and degree of risk attitudes, we replace the risk attitude index with four dummy 
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variables to distinguish between levels of risk aversion: willingness to take 1) No risk; 
2) Average risk; 3) Above average risk; 4) Substantial risk. 
Past research has focused most on the role of risk aversion on entrepreneurship.  
The distribution of risk preferences across types of employment by gender is presented 
in Table 4.  The first two columns show risk preferences for male and female 
entrepreneurs.  Surprisingly,  both self-employed men and women are most 
commonly found in the most risk averse group: 36% of male and 44% of female 
entrepreneurs.  However, the proportion of paid employees in the most risk averse 
category is even larger, consistent with the presumption that the most risk averse are 
more likely to select paid-employment over self-employment.  Consistent with that 
supposition, 55% of male entrepreneurs are in the two least risk averse categories 
compared to only 43% of paid employees.  Differences in risk preferences between 
female self-employed and paid-employed are less pronounced: 43% of female 
entrepreneurs and 37% of female paid employees are in the two least risk averse 
groups.  On the surface, it appears that risk preferences have a smaller effect on female 
entrepreneurial entry than it does on male entrepreneurship.    
Columns (3) and (6) in Table 4 present two-sample t tests between men and 
women within occupation.  Women are significantly more risk averse than men 
regardless of occupation.  Columns (7) and (8) test for differences in risk aversion 
between the self-employed and the paid-employed.  Entrepreneurs are less risk averse 
than are paid employees for both genders, but the differences are only marginally 
significant for women.  Nor is the more modest gap in risk aversion between women 
self- and paid-employees due to less variation in risk preferences among women:  
 14
variation in risk preferences across women is comparable to the variation in risk 
preferences for men as shown in the final row of Table 4.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Effect of risk aversion on occupational choice by gender 
In order to examine the influence of risk attitudes on occupational choice by 
gender, separate equations (13) and (14) were estimated for samples of men and women 
using a multinomial logit model.  The estimated marginal effects are reported in Table 
5 in two panels.  In Panel A, risk preferences are measured by the four point risk 
attitude index that goes from most (1) to least (4) risk averse.  In order to allow for a 
possible non- monotonic relationship between the probability of entry into self-
employment and the degree of risk attitudes, we replace the risk attitude index with 
three dummy variables that indicate degree of willingness to take risk, considering 
willingness to take “no risk” as the reference category.  Those estimates are reported 
in Panel B.  
Turning first to the control measures, wealth increases the probability of moving 
into self-employment rather than being paid-employed for both men and women, 
consistent with the findings of previous studies (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Evans and 
Jovanovic, 1989; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Fairlie, 2002).  In line with Schiller 
and Crewson (1997), more employment experiences induce women to stay in paid 
employment and discourage them from transitioning into self-employment.  
Conversely, men with more work experience are more likely to enter self-employment 
instead of paid-employment.  Health limitations encourage men to work in their own 
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business.  For women, those who reported health limitations tend to exit the labor 
force rather than enter the labor market. 
Age, education and race have no significant effect on an employment choice 
regardless of gender.  Lack of explanatory power of age might be because there are 
not enough variations in age in our sample.  Having entrepreneurial or professional 
parents has no significant effect on the probability of becoming self-employment for 
both men and women.4   
As shown in Table 5 Panel A, more favorable attitudes toward risk raise the 
probability of being self-employed by 2.4 % and reduce the incidence of selecting paid-
employment by 2.4% among men.  The finding is as predicted in the theory and is also 
consistent with the previous literature on risk preferences (Kanbur 1979; Kihlstrom and 
Laffont 1979, Parker 1997; Van Praag and Cramer 2001; Hartog et al. 2002; Cramer et 
al. 2002; Ekelund et al. 2005; Kan and Tsai 2006; Ahn, T. 2009).5  However, there is 
no statistically significant effect of risk preferences on the probability that women enter 
either self-employment or paid-employment.  Although the signs of the coefficients 
are the same as those for men, the magnitudes of the marginal effects for women are 
less than one-tenth those for men.  Measured risk aversion does not affect the labor 
force participation decision for either men or women.  
As the alternative specification shows in Panel B, for men, the marginal effects 
of the three risk attitude dummy variables on entry decision into self-employment are 
all positive and the size of the marginal effect gets progressively larger as willingness to 
take risk increases.  For example, an individual who is willing to take above average 
                                                     
4 Manager, official and proprietor are in the same occupational category for parental occupational 
background in the NLSY79. 
5 These studies have relied either on data sets of men only or of pooled samples of men and women. 
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risk (substantial risk) has a 5.8% (7.6%) higher probability of being self-employed 
relative to the individual who is unwilling to take any risk.  For women, on the other 
hand, the signs and magnitudes of the marginal effect of risk attitudes on self-
employment do not follow a systematic pattern and are never statistically significant.  
While risk attitudes play a key role in choosing entrepreneurship for men, they have no 
significant effect on women’s occupational choices.6   
This finding suggests that men and women place different weights on future 
earnings in self-employment.  Limited evidence on the motivations for entering self-
employment may support this conjecture.  For example, Georgellis and Wall (2005) 
found that larger expected earnings premia for self-employment versus paid-
employment increases entrepreneurial entry for men but not women.  Clain (2000) 
showed that full-time self-employed women have characteristics that are less valued in  
the market compared to full-time paid-employed women.  For men, the reverse is true, 
suggesting that women may place a higher value on non-pecuniary aspects of self-
employment than do men.   
 
4.2 Effect of risk aversion on hours and earnings by gender across 
employment type 
In this subsection, we examine the potential role of risk aversion on earnings 
and work hours by gender.  As shown in section 2, a more risk averse agent requires 
higher expected earnings from self-employment whereas the more risk averse accepts 
lower expected earnings from paid-employment.  The estimates of earnings model are 
                                                     
6 This study avoids a problem that the risk preferences is measure after the spell of self-employment is 
initiated by dropping those who were already self-employed when their risk attitudes were measured in 
1993.  Hartog et al. (2002) argue that ideally risk aversion should be measured before individuals make 
self-employment decision. Consequently, 402 observations were omitted from the sample.  The results 
are, however, robust to including these individuals in the sample (See the Appendix 3). 
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reported in Panel A of Table 6.  Consistent with the theory, greater risk aversion 
increases male returns to self-employment.  However, there is no significant effect of 
measured risk preferences on the earnings of the female self-employed.  The 
coefficient on risk preferences for women is less than 98% of the size for men.  This is 
consistent with our earlier finding that risk aversion does not affect women’s entry 
decision on self-employment.   
For men engaged in wage work, willingness to accept risk is associated with 
lower male wage which is inconsistent with theory.  The most risk averse are paid 
almost 12% more than the least risk averse.  The least risk averse women are paid 
more in wage work consistent with the theory, although the differences are small.  
Going from the least to the most risk averse lowers pay by 6%.7  
Risk aversion can also affect hours of labor supplied although the direction of 
the effect is ambiguous.  We estimated equation (16) and report the estimated risk 
aversion effect by gender and employment type in Panel B of Table 6.  The complete 
results from the labor supply estimation are presented in Appendix 5.  As with our 
labor force participation results, there is no significant relationship between risk 
preferences and hours of work for either men or women.  
4.3 Do gender differences in risk aversion explain the observed gender gaps in 
the labor market outcomes? 
Given our behavioral estimates of the entrepreneurial choice, earnings, and 
hours of labor supply decisions, we can now assess the extent to which gender 
differences in risk aversion explain the gender gaps in these labor market outcomes.   
                                                     
7 Estimates of log annual earnings are reported in Appendix 4.  The signs on risk preferences are 
consistent with those from log hourly earnings although the estimates lose precision. 
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To measure how much differences in risk preferences between men and women 
explain the gender gap in entrepreneurial choice, we apply Fairlie’s (1999) nonlinear 
variant of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition.  The difference in probability of self-
employment across genders is   
1 1
( ) ( )m ff m m f f f f fN Nm f i i
s s m f
i i
F X F XP P
N N
δ θ β δ θ β
= =
⎡ ⎤+ +− = −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑      
               
1 1
( ) ( )m fm m m m f m m fN Ni i
m m
i i
F X F X
N N
δ θ β δ θ β
= =
⎡ ⎤+ ++ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑        (17) 
where N j is the sample size for gender j; sP  is the probability of choosing self-
employment; gX  for g=m, f  are identical to the gX  in (13).   
 The standard linear decomposition introduced by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca 
(1973) is applied for earnings and labor supply differences:  
ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ( ) ( )m f m f f m m fik ik k k k k k kY Y X X Xα α α− = − + −                            (18) 
ˆ ˆ ˆln ln ( ) ( )m f m f f m m fik ik k k k k k kh h X X Xψ ψ ψ− = − + −                           (19) 
where gX  for g=m, f are the same as those in (15).   
We only report the first component of the decomposition that captures 
contributions from differences in observed risk preferences between men and women. 
The weighted female coefficients in (17), (18), and (19) can be replaced by male’s 
estimates or pooled estimates.  
Table 7 reports percentage contribution of risk preferences to the gender gaps in 
three outcomes by employment type.  The percentage contribution is calculated as 
estimated coefficient from decomposition dividing by mean difference in outcome (i.e., 
entrepreneurial choice, earnings, or hours of work) and then multiplying by 100.  The 
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female coefficients from table 6 are used in specification 1 and the male coefficients are 
applied in specification 2.  Estimates for a pooled sample of men and women are 
incorporated in specification 3. 
Conclusions based on the decomposition analysis are sensitive to the choice of 
coefficient on self-employment.8  For instance, gender differences in risk aversion 
explain 2% of the entrepreneurial choice gap between men and women in the female-
weighted decomposition, but 12 % of the gap in the male-weighted decomposition.  
Similarly, if women had risk preferences equal to those of men, their entrepreneurial 
earnings would be only about 1% less if we take women’s coefficients as weights, but 
would be 19% lower using men’s coefficients.  Regardless of choice of coefficients 
applied, risk preferences explain little of the difference in hours worked or earnings 
from wage work between men and women. 
Most commonly, researchers use the male coefficients in decompositions 
because of a presumption that the male coefficients are not subject to discrimination.    
However, this application reflects behavioral decisions regarding occupation, earnings 
and hours worked.  Therefore, it is appropriate to see how a woman with risk 
preferences equivalent to those of a male would have affected her behavioral decisions 
regarding choice of occupation and associated occupational earnings and hours of work.  
That argument suggests that we should use the female-weighted decomposition to 
analyze how much risk preferences would affect female labor market outcomes.9   
Using that criterion, risk preferences explain only 1.9% of the gap in 
entrepreneurial choice between men and women.  Equalizing risk preferences across 
                                                     
8 This is a common problem so called “index number problem” in the standard decomposition. See 
Oaxaca (1973) for more detail. 
9 For a linear case, ˆ ˆ ˆ( )m f f m f f fθ θ δ θ δ θ δ− = − .  The first term is counterfactual earnings that 
women would have if women had men’s risk aversion level.  The second term is actual earnings.  
Expected change in women’s entrepreneurial choice can be measured as the same way. 
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the genders would alter relative women’s pay by only about 1% in either self-
employment or paid employment.  Likewise, equalizing risk preferences would 
change relative women’s hours worked by less than 1% in both occupations.  
 
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
The aim of this subsection is to show the extent to which conclusions regarding 
the impact of risk preferences on labor market choices are robust to changes in 
specification.  The first change is to replace all individual attributes that were averaged 
over the 9 year estimation window with their start-of-period (i.e., 1993) values.  
Second, different time spans for observing labor market outcomes are used: 1994-1996, 
1994-1998 and 1994-2000.  Finally, potentially endogenous variables such as number 
of children, presence of young children and wealth are excluded as control variables 
from the estimation.  The estimated marginal effects of risk attitudes are presented in 
Table 8.  The main estimation results are reported in the first row for reference.  In all 
instances, we find that increasing willingness to accept risk raises the probability of 
self-employment and lowers the probability of wage work only for men.  In all 
specifications, risk preferences do not affect women’s occupational choices.  
We use the same modifications to our specifications to evaluate the robustness 
of our results for earnings and labor supply.  The results reported in Table 9 show that 
the signs on risk preferences are stable in most cases.  When signs are not consistent 
with the main estimates the significance level falls below 10%. 
Table 10 reports contributions of risk preferences to the gender gap in 
entrepreneurial choice, earnings, and hours of labor supply.  We only focus on the 
specification 1 (female-weighted decomposition) and so we are assessing how women’s 
estimated behavioral choices would have been different had they had the risk 
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preferences of an average male in the population.  Depending on specification, 
differences in risk preferences explain only 0.1% to 4.5% of the gap in entrepreneurial 
choice between men and women.  With one exception, the entrepreneurial earnings 
gap would be even larger if women had the same level of risk acceptance as men.  The 
gender pay gap for wage work and for hours worked are also largely unaffected by 
differences in risk preferences between men and women with the explained gap rarely 
exceeding 1% in absolute value.  In short, the commonly observed differences in risk 
preferences across genders explain little of the observed gaps in labor market outcomes 
between men and women.  
 
5. Summary and conclusion 
This study examines the extent to which gender differences in risk preferences 
can explain male-female gaps in self-employment rate, earnings, and labor supply.  
Exploiting a 9-year longitudinal sample of men and women in the NLSY79, we confirm 
the standardized gender gap reported in the previous literature: on average, women are 
less likely to become self-employed, earn less and work fewer hours than men.  
Furthermore, NLSY79 shows that considerable differences in measured risk 
preferences between men and women exist: women are more risk averse than men.   
In a theoretical framework, we show the potential role of risk aversion in occupational 
choice, earnings, and hours of work: negative relationship between risk aversion and 
entrepreneurial choice, positive relationship between risk aversion and expected return 
from self-employment, and negative relationship between risk aversion and expected 
wage from paid-employment.  Although risk aversion can also affect hours of work, 
the direction of effect cannot be signed.  
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  We find that risk preferences are an important factor that affects occupational 
choice for men – less risk averse men tend to become self-employed and more risk 
averse men become wage workers.  However, there is no relationship between degree 
of risk preferences and occupational choice for women.  A different role of risk 
preferences in earnings by gender across employment type is also found.  Less risk 
aversion is associated with lower male earnings in self-employment.  On the other 
hand, there is no significant effect of measured risk preferences on female 
entrepreneurial earnings.  In paid-employment, less risk aversion lowers the male 
wage whereas it raises female wages.  Finally, we find no relationship between risk 
aversion and hours of labor for both men and women across employment type.      
Consequently, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition shows that gender differences 
in risk attitudes explain only small part of gender gap in self-employment rate.  
Similarly, those differences in risk preferences account for only a trivial portion of the 
gender gap in hours worked or earnings.  The results hold up well against a variety of 
sensitivity checks.  These findings suggest that widely reported differences in risk 
preferences across genders do not play a role in explaining differences in labor market 
outcomes between men and women.  
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Figure 1 Change in expected utility associated with various expected return and 
coefficient variation as θ increases. 
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Note: CVs and CVw denote coefficient variation in self-employment and paid-employment, respectively. 
The case of CVw<CVs<1 is not considered because if both CVs and CVw are less than 1, there is little 
difference in risk between s and w.  
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Table 1 Distribution of employment status (1994~2002) by gender aged 29~45 
Employment status Men Women Total 
Self-employed 423 
(15.9%) 
367 
(13.2%) 
790 
Paid- employed 2,172 
(81.6%) 
2236 
(80.4%) 
4,408 
Out of labor force 67 
(2.5%) 
178 
(6.4%) 
245 
Total 2,662 2,781 5,443 
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Table 2 Self-employment rate, hourly earnings and labor supply by gender 
                    Mean (std) 
  (1) Men (2) Women (3) Mean 
Differences 
Self-employment Self-employment rate 0.16 
(0.01) 
0.13 
(0.01) 
0.03*** 
(2.82) 
 Log hourly earnings 7.20 
(0.93) 
6.80 
(1.05) 
0.39*** 
(0.07) 
 Obs. 397 328  
 Log hours worked 3.88 
(0.38) 
3.51 
(0.68) 
0.36*** 
(0.04) 
 Obs. 364 307  
Paid-employment Log hourly earnings 7.53 
(0.59) 
7.22 
(0.59) 
0.31*** 
(0.02) 
 Obs. 2,159 2,216  
 Log hours worked 3.80 
(0.00) 
3.60 
(0.01) 
0.20*** 
(0.01) 
 Obs. 2,148 2,171  
 Note: Column (3) is two-sample t-test between men and women 
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Table 3 Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables 
 
Definition 
Men Women 
 Mean (Std) Mean (Std) 
Risk acceptance index (1-4) Four point risk attitude index: increasing in 
willingness to take financial risk 
2.29 (1.28)   2.09(1.22) 
Willingness to take:    
No risk =1 if risk index=1 0.44 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 
Average risk =1 if risk index=2 0.11 (0.31) 0.13 (0.33) 
Above average risk =1 if risk index=3 0.17 (0.38) 0.17 (0.38) 
Substantial risk =1 if risk index=4 0.28 (0.45) 0.21 (0.41) 
log(net-asset) Difference between all asset values and all debts 14.23 (0.33) 14.21 (0.45) 
Education Years of schooling completed 12.81 (2.41) 12.84 (2.36) 
Work experience (in year) Years of employment experience 14.67 (4.09)  11.97(5.38) 
Number of kids Number of bio/step/adopted children in HH 1.17 (1.15)   1.67(1.17) 
Presence of pre-school kid =1 if pre-school age child (age<6) is present 0.32 (0.33) 0.35 (0.34) 
Presence of school kid =1 if a child aged 7 to 12 is present 0.16 (0.21) 0.26 (0.22) 
Age Age in years 35.69 (2.28) 35.81(2.23) 
Married, spouse present =1 if married and spouse present 0.56 (0.43) 0.55 (0.44) 
Health limitation =1 if health problem limits ability to work  0.08 (0.21)   0.12(0.24) 
White =1 if white 0.64 (0.48)   0.63(0.48) 
Father education Years of schooling his/her father completed 10.70 (4.22) 10.48 (4.15) 
Father professional/proprietor =1 if father has/had professional/proprietor 0.10 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 
Mother education Years of schooling his/her mother completed 10.81 (3.27) 10.63 (3.13) 
Mother professional/proprietor =1 if mother has/had professional/proprietor 0.03 (0.16)   0.02(0.14) 
Urban =1 if reside in urban area 0.76 (0.34) 0.76 (0.34) 
Northeast =1 if reside in northeast 0.34 (0.36) 0.16 (0.36) 
North central =1 if reside in north central 0.24 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 
South =1 if reside in south 0.41 (0.48)   0.42(0.48) 
West =1 if reside in west 0.18 (0.37) 0.17 (0.37) 
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Table 4 Measured risk preferences by occupational choice and gender 
Note: Column (3), (6) are two-sample t test between men and women within self-employment and paid-employment, 
respectively. Column (7), (8) are two-sample t test between self- and paid-employment within gender and risk 
aversion. ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. Standard errors are in parenthesis. t-statistics are 
in bracket. 
  
 Self-employment Paid-employment Mean(Self)-Mean(paid) 
Risk index 
(1) 
men 
(2) 
women 
   (3) 
Mean diff. 
(4)  
men 
(5)  
women 
(6)  
Mean diff. 
(7) 
Men 
(8) 
Women 
1:  unwilling to take financial risk (most risk averse category)   
Observation 151 
(36%) 
162 
(44%) 
 992 
(45%) 
1,125 
(50%) 
   
Mean 
 
0.359 
(0.02) 
0.444 
(0.03) 
-0.085 
[2.44]*** 
0.455 
(0.01) 
0.502 
(0.01) 
-0.047*** 
[3.10] 
-0.097*** 
[3.67] 
-0.058** 
[ 2.07] 
2: willing to take average risk   
Observation 38 
(9%) 
48 
(13%) 
 252 
(12%) 
278 
(12%) 
   
Mean 
 
0.090 
(0.01) 
0.132 
(0.02) 
-0.041* 
[1.85] 
0.115 
(0.01) 
0.123 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
[0.82] 
-0.025 
[1.50] 
0.008 
[0.43] 
3: willing to take above average risk   
Observation 88 
(21%) 
78 
(21%) 
 355 
(16%) 
379 
(17%) 
   
Mean 
 
0.209 
(0.02) 
0.214 
(0.02) 
-0.005 
[0.16] 
0.163 
(0.01) 
0.170 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
[0.62] 
0.046** 
[2.30] 
0.044** 
[2.04] 
4:willing to take substantial risk (least risk averse category)   
Observation 144 
(34%) 
77 
(21%) 
 582 
(27%) 
456 
(20%)  
  
Mean 
 
0.342 
(0.02) 
0.211 
(0.02) 
0.131*** 
[4.12] 
0.267 
(0.01) 
0.205 
(0.01) 
0.062*** 
[4.84] 
0.076*** 
[3.18] 
0.006 
[0.28] 
Total Obs. 421 
(100%) 
365 
(100%) 
 2,181 
(100%) 
2,238 
(100%) 
   
Risk 
acceptance 
index 
2.53 
(1.29) 
2.19 
( 1.21) 
0.343*** 
[3.83] 
2.24 
( 1.28) 
2.076 
(1.22) 
0.163*** 
[4.34] 
0.294*** 
[4.33] 
0.115* 
[1.68] 
Coefficient 
of Variation  
0.510 0.553 
 
0.571 0.588 
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Table 5 Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects of Determinants of Occupational Choice for Men and 
Women (1994~2002) 
 Men Women 
 Self- 
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Self-
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Panel A       
Risk acceptance index(1-4) 0.024*** 
(3.86) 
-0.024*** 
(3.86) 
1.91e-07 
(0.87) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
-0.001 
(0.10) 
-0.001 
(0.81) 
Education -0.002 
(0.41) 
0.002 
(0.41) 
-3.66e-07 
(1.31) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
-0.001 
(0.19) 
0.000 
(0.53) 
Age -0.106 
(1.04) 
0.106 
(1.04) 
5.90e-06 
(1.07) 
-0.043 
(0.39) 
0.047 
(0.43) 
-0.004 
(0.48) 
Age squared 0.002 
(0.95) 
-0.002 
(0.95) 
-9.27e-08 
(0.97) 
0.001 
(0.44) 
-0.001 
(0.48) 
0.000 
(0.58) 
Work experience 0.005* 
(1.74) 
-0.005* 
(1.74) 
-3.28e-07  
(1.30) 
-0.005** 
(2.35) 
0.007***   
(3.37) 
-0.002*** 
(3.85) 
log(net asset) 0.072*** 
(2.98) 
-0.072*** 
(2.98) 
3.16e-07 
(0.37) 
0.057** 
(2.30) 
-0.063** 
(2.55) 
0.007** 
(2.62) 
White 0.022 
(1.12) 
-0.022 
(1.12) 
1.15e-08 
(0.02) 
0.022 
(1.09) 
-0.023 
(1.10) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
Married, spouse present 0.023 
(0.79) 
-0.023 
(0.79) 
3.24e-07  
(0.34) 
0.017 
(0.75) 
-0.021 
(0.93) 
0.004* 
(1.94) 
Number of Kids  -0.012 
(0.87) 
0.012 
(0.87) 
6.62e-08 
(0.17) 
-0.002 
(0.22) 
0.003 
(0.28) 
-0.001 
(1.01) 
Presence of young kids (0~6) -0.032 
(0.80) 
0.032 
(0.80) 
-2.97e-07 
(0.23) 
0.042 
(1.24) 
-0.054 
(1.58) 
0.012*** 
(2.99) 
Presence of young kids (7~12) -0.120*  
(1.88) 
0.120* 
(1.88) 
2.82e-07  
(0.16) 
-0.043 
(0.93) 
0.049 
(1.05) 
-0.006 
(1.47) 
Health limitation to work 0.094* 
(1.92) 
-0.094* 
(1.92) 
4.27e-06 
(1.27) 
0.043 
(1.13) 
-0.054   
(1.41) 
0.011***   
(2.99) 
Mother’s education 0.006 
(1.58) 
-0.006 
(1.58) 
3.41e-08 
(0.37) 
-0.001 
(0.14) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
-0.000 
(0.45) 
Father’s education 0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.000 
(0.03) 
-1.44e-08 
(0.22) 
0.003   
(1.11) 
-0.004 
(1.25) 
0.000* 
(1.72) 
Mother-professional/proprietor -0.005 
(0.11) 
0.005 
(0.11) 
-2.96e-06 
(1.16) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.04) 
-0.002 
(0.56) 
Father-professional/proprietor -0.030 
(1.30) 
0.030 
(1.30) 
-0.0001 
(1.10) 
0.045 
(1.48) 
-0.046 
(1.52) 
0.002   
(0.51) 
Urban -0.023 
(0.94) 
0.023 
(0.94) 
1.33e-06 
(1.14) 
-0.020 
(0.79) 
0.017 
(0.67) 
0.003    
(1.39) 
Panel B       
Willingness to take:       
Average risk 0.006 
(0.00) 
-0.006 
(0.00) 
-1.84e-06 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.05) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.57) 
Above average risk 0.058** 
(2.18) 
-0.058** 
(-2.18) 
1.91e-08 
(0.00) 
0.033 
(1.34) 
-0.030 
(1.23) 
-0.003 
(1.74)* 
Substantial risk 0.076*** 
(3.32) 
-0.076*** 
(-3.32) 
1.19e-08 
(0.00) 
-0.011 
(0.48) 
0.011 
(0.50) 
-0.001 
(0.34) 
Note: 1) The reference category in Panel B is willingness to take “no risk”. 2) Same control variables as Panel A are 
included in Panel B and C. 3) 4 regions are also included in all Panels) 4) Standard errors can be provided on request 
4)***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.  
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Table 6 Estimates of Earnings and labor supply for self-employed, paid-employed and overall labor force 
participants by gender 
 Self-employment Paid-employment 
 Male Female Male Female 
Panel A log hourly earnings     
Risk acceptance index 
-0.192*** 
(3.54) 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.039*** 
(3.20) 
0.020** 
(2.12) 
Education 
0.081*** 
(3.48) 
0.021 
(0.59) 
0.085*** 
(14.75) 
0.080*** 
(13.28) 
Age 
0.889 
(1.27) 
-0.632 
(0.74) 
-0.238 
(1.61) 
-0.123 
(0.78) 
Age squared 
-0.013 
(1.16) 
0.009 
(0.68) 
0.004* 
(1.66) 
0.001 
(0.60) 
Work experience 
-0.031 
(1.47) 
0.043** 
(2.54) 
0.031*** 
(7.83) 
0.049*** 
(9.49) 
White 
-0.014 
(0.11) 
-0.189 
(0.99) 
0.053* 
(1.79) 
-0.013 
(0.43) 
Married 
0.051 
(0.30) 
-0.501** 
(2.61) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.074** 
(2.28) 
Number of kids 
-0.010 
(0.12) 
-0.038 
(0.44) 
0.028 
(1.58) 
0.013 
(0.80) 
Presence of a kid aged under 6 
0.152 
(0.61) 
-0.497* 
(1.68) 
0.140** 
(2.45) 
-0.111** 
(2.14) 
Presence of a kid aged 7-12 
1.120*** 
(2.99) 
0.077 
(0.21) 
0.251*** 
(2.96) 
0.049 
(0.71) 
Health problem 
-0.788** 
(2.52) 
-0.620* 
(1.85) 
-1.091*** 
(7.92) 
-0.283*** 
(4.12) 
Mother education 
-0.066*** 
(3.19) 
-0.016 
(0.57) 
0.002 
(0.39) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
Father education 
0.027* 
(1.68) 
0.005 
(0.25) 
0.004 
(1.04) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
Urban 
0.207 
(1.29) 
0.268 
(1.23) 
0.107*** 
(2.98) 
0.131*** 
(3.63) 
Years in business 
0.121*** 
(3.19) 
0.159** 
(2.53) 
- - 
Heckman’s selection 
-9.032*** 
(3.94) 
-13.100*** 
(3.07) 
4.731*** 
(6.06) 
1.097* 
(1.85) 
R2 0.2327 0.2025 0.3403 0.3611 
N 309 242 1651 1530 
Panel B log hours of labor     
Risk attitudes 
-0.030 
(1.36) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(0.90) 
-0.002 
(0.36) 
R2 0.153 0.201 0.059 0.223 
N 277 221 1629 1488 
Note: Risk acceptance index is measured by a categorical variable from the most (1) to the least risk averse. In Panel 
A, average hourly earnings are dependent variable. In Panel B, average hours worked per week are dependent 
variable. Same controls in Panel A are used in Panel B. Four regions are controlled in both Panels. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. */**/*** refer significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. The complete results from the labor supply 
estimation are presented in Appendix 5. 
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Table 7 Decomposition for occupational choice, earnings and labor supply models: estimates of 
percentage of gender gap due to Male/Female differences in Risk preferences 
  
             (1) 
Female coefficient 
           (2) 
Male coefficient 
              (3) 
Pooled coefficient 
Entrepreneurial choice 
 Coefficient 0.0004 0.0024 0.0018 
 Difference 0.0202 0.0202 0.02022 
 Percentage 1.9% 11.8% 8.8% 
Log Earnings     
Self-employed Coefficient -0.0022 -0.0835 -0.0120 
 Difference 0.4366 0.4366 0.4366 
 Percentage -0.5% -19.1% -2.7% 
Paid-employed Coefficient 0.0028 -0.0052 0.0021 
 Difference 0.3121 0.3121 0.3121 
 Percentage 0.9% -1.7% 0.7% 
Log hours worked     
Self-employed Coefficient -0.0012 -0.0130 0.0031 
 Difference 0.4162 0.4162 0.4162 
 Percentage -0.3% -3.1% 0.8% 
Paid-employed Coefficient -0.0003 -0.0006 0.0014 
 Difference 0.2037 0.2037 0.2037 
 Percentage -0.1% -0.3% 0.7% 
Note) Difference indicates mean differences in outcomes  such as entrepreneurial choice, earnings, and hours of 
labor. Percentage is calculated as (coefficient/difference)*100. 
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Table 8 Robustness of risk preferences in occupational choice 
 Men (four point risk index) Women (four point risk index) 
 Self-
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Self 
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Main estimation 
(1994~2002) 
0.024*** 
(3.86) 
-0.024*** 
(3.86) 
1.91e-07 
(0.87) 
0.0016 
(0.17) 
-0.0007 
(0.10) 
-0.0005 
(0.81) 
1993 Control variables 
0.025*** 
(4.13) 
-0.025*** 
(4.13) 
7.63e-07 
(0.00) 
0.0066 
(1.08) 
-0.0044 
(0.69) 
-0.0022 
(1.23) 
1994-1996 
0.012*** 
(3.01) 
-0.012*** 
(2.99) 
-0.0000 
(0.11) 
-0.0004 
(0.09) 
0.0019 
(0.40) 
-0.0015 
(0.66) 
1994-1998 
0.017*** 
(3.58) 
-0.017*** 
(3.56) 
-0.0001 
(0.54) 
0.0038 
(0.77) 
-0.0029 
(0.57) 
-0.0009 
(0.71) 
1994-2000 
0.020*** 
(3.79) 
-0.020*** 
(3.79) 
-7.38e-06 
(0.04) 
0.0035 
(0.60) 
-0.0028 
(0.48) 
-0.0007 
(0.74) 
Exclude number of kids, 
presence of young 
children, wealth 
0.028*** 
(4.59) 
-0.028*** 
(4.50) 
 1.26e-06 
  (0.00) 
0.0071 
(1.17) 
-0.0055 
(-0.90) 
-0.0016 
(-1.62) 
Note: 1) t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 2) ***/**/* indicates significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.   
 
 38
Table 9 Robustness of risk preferences in earnings and labor supply 
 Self-employment Paid-employment 
 Male Female Male Female 
Panel A log hourly earnings     
Main estimate (1994-2002) 
-0.192*** 
(3.54) 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.039*** 
(3.20) 
0.020** 
(2.12) 
1993 Control variables 
-0.143** 
(2.42) 
0.033 
(0.54) 
-0.041*** 
(2.67) 
0.020** 
(2.16) 
1994-1996 
-0.103 
(1.26) 
-0.095 
(1.21) 
0.021 
(1.46) 
-0.011 
(0.62) 
1994-1998 
-0.176* 
(1.90) 
-0.103 
(1.03) 
0.021   
(1.07) 
0.007 
(0.30) 
1994-2000 
-0.196 
(1.28) 
-0.100 
(0.73) 
0.036 
(1.36) 
0.048 
(1.52) 
Exclude number of kids, presence of 
young children, wealth  
-0.140*** 
(2.73) 
-0.004 
(0.08) 
-0.014 
(1.25) 
0.019** 
(2.01) 
Panel B log hours worked     
Main estimate (1994-2002) 
-0.030 
(1.36) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(0.90) 
-0.002 
(0.36) 
1993 Control variables 
-0.056** 
(2.25) 
-0.011 
(0.26) 
-0.005 
(1.19) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
1994-1996 
-0.146* 
(1.76) 
-0.031   
(0.25) 
-0.014 
(1.01) 
-0.018 
(0.90) 
1994-1998 
-0.074 
(0.52) 
0.030 
(0.21) 
-0.019 
(0.94) 
-0.021 
(0.80) 
1994-2000 
0.160 
(0.76) 
-0.160 
(0.88) 
-0.023 
(0.78) 
-0.056* 
(1.68) 
Exclude number of kids, presence of 
young children, wealth  
-0.010 
(0.48) 
0.004 
(0.10) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.002 
(0.27) 
Note: Averaging time-varying characteristics are controlled in the main regression based 9 years of time window. t-
statistics are in parentheses. */**/*** refer significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.   
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Table 10 Robustness of decomposition of entrepreneurial choice with respect to risk preferences 
  Entrepreneurial choice 
Earnings Hours worked 
   Self-employment 
Paid-
employment 
Self-
employment 
Paid-
employment 
Main estimation:1994-
2002 
Coefficient 0.0004 -0.0022 0.0028 -0.0012 -0.0003 
Difference 0.0202 0.4366 0.3121 0.4162 0.2037 
Percentage 1.9% -0.5% 0.9% -0.3% -0.1% 
1993 Control variables Coefficient 0.0010 0.0152 0.0029  -0.0043 0.0004 
 Difference 0.0259 0.3995 0.3133 0.4035 0.2051 
 Percentage 4.0% 3.4% 0.9% -1.1% 0.2% 
1994-1996 Coefficient 2.09E-05 -0.0428 -0.0018 -0.0046 -0.0073 
 Difference 0.0196 0.6087 0.4190 0.6044 0.3859 
 Percentage 0.1% -7.0% -0.4% -0.8% -1.9% 
1994-1998 Coefficient 0.0005 -0.0376 0.0012 0.0249 -0.0033 
 Difference 0.0239 0.7048 0.5581 0.6890 0.5835 
 Percentage 1.9% -5.3% 0.2% 3.6% -0.6% 
1994-2000 Coefficient 0.0006 -0.0404 0.0083 -0.0082 -0.0088 
 Difference 0.0203 0.9143 0.6958 1.0880 0.6914 
 Percentage 2.9% -4.4% 1.2% -0.7% -1.3% 
Exclude number of kids, 
presence of young 
children, wealth  
Coefficient 0.0012 -0.0019 0.0026   0.0017 -0.0002 
Difference 0.0259 0.4366 0.3121 0.4162 0.2037 
Percentage 4.5% -0.4% 0.8% 0.4% -0.1% 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of 0wμθ
∂ <∂  
For simplicity, subscript y  is dropped. 
2
1 1 (1 ) ( ; , )
1 2
s ss
s s s L s s
s
EU e e fθ σθμ μ θ μ σθ μ
− ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= − + − ≡⎜ ⎟−⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
               (1) 
2
1 1 (1 ) ( ; , )
1 2
w ww
w w w L w w
w
EU e e fθ σθμ μ θ μ σθ μ
− ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥= − + − ≡⎜ ⎟−⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
             (2) 
Let’s assume that there exists expected return from paid-employment, ˆwμ , that 
keeps an individual i indifferent between self-employment and paid-employment:  
ˆ( ; , ) ( ; , )s ws s w wf fθ μ σ θ μ σ=                                        (3) 
We are interested in assessing how increases in risk aversion affect the required 
wage in order to choose paid-employment, holding other things constant.  Taking total 
derivative of (3) with respect to θ  and ˆwμ  yields 
ˆ
ˆ
s w w
w
w
f f fd d dθ θ μθ θ μ
∂ ∂ ∂= +∂ ∂ ∂                                         (4) 
ˆ
0
ˆ
s w
w
w
w
f f
d
fd
θ θμ
θ
μ
⎛ ⎞∂ ∂−⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠⇔ = <∂
∂
                                        (5) 
where 
2 2
11ˆ ˆ(1 ) 0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 2
w
w w
w w w w
w w w w
f e eθ θσ σθ θθ μ μμ θ μ μ μ
− −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= − − + >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
                         
Numerator of (5) is negative because 
sf
θ
∂
∂ is more negative than 
wf
θ
∂
∂ as shown 
in Figure 1, and denominator of (5) is positive based on the presumption that 0 < θ < 1.  
Therefore, the equation (5) is negative, which implies that a more risk averse individual 
requires lower wage from paid-employment than their less risk averse counterparts 
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when they decide to enter wage work, holding other things fixed.     
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Appendix 2 
Assume that an individual i chooses j occupation and so selects ej for j=s, w at a 
fixed level of utility ju . 
Let 
2
1 1 (1 ) ( ; , ) (1 )
1 2
j
j j j L j j j j L j
j
e e e g e uθ
σθμ μ θ μ σ μθ μ
−
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥− + − ≡ + − =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦     
(1) 
Taking total derivative of (1) with respect with θ  and je  yields 
( ; , ) 0j j j j L j
gg de e d deθ μ σ θ μθ
∂+ − =∂                                                 
( ; , )
j
j
j j L
gede
d g
θ
θ θ μ σ μ
∂− ∂⇔ = −
வ
ழ
0                                       (2) 
Numerator of (2) is positive because 0gθ
∂ <∂ from Figure 1 and 0je > .  But, 
sign of denominator of (12) is ambiguous depending on the relative sizes of utility from 
market work, ( ; , )j jg θ μ σ and utility from nonmarket work, Lμ .  
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Appendix 3 Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects of Determinants of Occupational Choice for Men and 
Women (1994~2002): Including those who were self-employed in 1993 
 Men  Women 
 Self-
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Self-
Employment 
Paid-
Employment 
Not 
working 
Panel A       
Risk acceptance index(1-4) 0.021*** 
(2.95) 
-0.021*** 
(2.91) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.20) 
-0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.000 
(0.87) 
Education -0.011**   
(2.30) 
0.011** 
(2.09) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(0.03) 
 0.000     
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.43) 
Age -0.077 
(0.67) 
0.076 
(0.62) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.012 
(0.10) 
-0.007 
(0.06) 
-0.005 
(0.62) 
Age squared 0.001  
(0.61) 
-0.001 
(0.57) 
-6.38e-06 
(0.01) 
-0.000 
(0.05) 
9.03e-06 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(0.70) 
Work experience 0.006* 
(1.93) 
-0.006 
(1.62) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.005** 
(2.23) 
0.007*** 
(3.11) 
-0.002*** 
(3.82) 
log(net asset) 0.173*** 
(6.69) 
-0.173 
(6.70) 
0.000  
(0.01) 
0.105***   
(4.00) 
-0.111*** 
(4.20) 
0.006***   
(2.69) 
White 0.040* 
(1.82) 
-0.040 
(1.82) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.037*   
(1.66) 
-0.038* 
(1.68) 
0.001 
(0.42) 
Married, spouse present -0.030 
(0.95) 
0.030 
(0.95) 
9.64e-06 
(0.01) 
0.040 
(1.58) 
-0.043* 
(1.71) 
0.003* 
(1.78) 
Number of Kids  -0.008   
(0.59) 
0.008 
(0.58) 
4.39e-06 
(0.01) 
0.015 
(1.20) 
-0.014 
(1.14) 
-0.001 
(0.91) 
Presence of young kids (0~6) -0.022 
(0.49) 
0.022   
(0.49) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.006 
(0.16) 
-0.016 
(0.43) 
0.010*** 
(2.92) 
Presence of young kids (7~12) -0.113 
(1.80) 
0.113* 
(1.80) 
-3.79e-06  
(0.01) 
-0.095* 
(1.89) 
0.101** 
(2.00) 
-0.006 
(1.62) 
Health limitation to work 0.102* 
(1.82) 
-0.102*   
(1.64) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.064   
(1.53) 
-0.074* 
(1.75) 
0.009*** 
(2.96) 
Mother’s education 0.005   
(1.30) 
-0.005 
(1.30) 
2.17e-06 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
-0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.000 
(0.55) 
Father’s education 0.001 
(0.45) 
-0.001 
(0.45) 
-9.30e-07 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.67) 
-0.002 
(0.79) 
0.000* 
(1.76) 
Mother-
professional/proprietor 
-0.016 
(0.34) 
0.016   
(0.34) 
-0.000 
(0.01) 
0.009 
(0.16) 
-0.007 
(0.13) 
-0.002 
(0.43) 
Father-professional/proprietor -0.017 
(0.64) 
0.018 
(0.60) 
-0.000 
(0.02) 
0.078**   
(2.41) 
-0.080**    
(2.44) 
0.001 
(0.57) 
Urban -0.023 
(0.83) 
0.023 
(0.80) 
0.000   
(0.01) 
-0.015 
(0.55) 
0.013 
(0.46) 
0.003 
(1.32) 
 
 
  
 44
Appendix 4 Estimates of log annual earnings across employment type by gender  
 Self-employment Paid-employment 
 Male Female Male Female 
Risk acceptance index(1-4) 
-0.070 
(0.64) 
-0.073 
(0.52) 
-0.105*** 
(6.86) 
0.009 
(0.62) 
Education 
-0.007 
(0.14) 
0.102 
(1.21) 
0.116*** 
(15.99) 
0.097*** 
(10.29) 
Age 
1.716 
(1.21) 
1.307 
(0.64) 
-0.038 
(0.20) 
-0.777*** 
(3.16) 
Age squared 
-0.024 
(1.10) 
-0.022 
(0.69) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.012*** 
(2.98) 
Work experience 
-0.105** 
(2.23) 
0.016 
(0.43) 
0.095***  
(19.08) 
0.106*** 
(12.74) 
White 
0.215 
(0.78) 
-0.494 
(1.11) 
0.062* 
(1.67) 
-0.008 
(0.18) 
Married 
-0.113 
(0.33) 
-0.164 
(0.36) 
0.058 
(1.06) 
-0.106** 
(2.09) 
Number of kids 
-0.020 
(0.12) 
-0.044 
(0.23) 
0.036 
(1.63) 
0.028 
(1.10) 
Presence of a kid aged under 6 
0.414 
(0.85) 
-1.097* 
(1.80) 
0.301*** 
(4.24) 
-0.212*** 
(2.58) 
Presence of a kid aged 7-12 
0.512 
(0.65) 
-0.311 
(0.37) 
0.644*** 
(6.11) 
-0.111 
(1.02) 
Health problem 
-1.362** 
(2.08) 
0.007 
(0.01) 
-2.358*** 
(13.73) 
-0.503*** 
(4.47) 
Mother education 
-0.064 
(1.46) 
-0.024 
(0.40) 
-0.0154*** 
(2.37) 
-0.014* 
(1.74) 
Father education 
0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.029 
(0.57) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.008 
(1.24) 
Urban 
0.265 
(0.80) 
1.325*** 
(2.57) 
0.126*** 
(2.79) 
0.042 
(0.73) 
Years in business 
0.269*** 
(3.71) 
0.213* 
(1.68) 
- - 
Heckman’s selection 
-10.291** 
(2.36) 
-19.410** 
(2.30) 
10.337*** 
(10.53) 
-0.982  
(1.03) 
R2 0.229 0.261 0.517 0.470 
N 172 103 1642 1510 
Note: Risk attitudes are measured by a categorical variable from the most (1) to the least risk aversion. Four regions 
are controlled in both Panels.  t-statistics are in parentheses. */**/*** refer significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.   
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Appendix 5 Estimates of labor supply across employment type by gender 
 Self-employment Paid-employment All working 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Risk acceptance index(1-4) 
-0.030 
(1.36) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(0.90) 
-0.002 
(0.36) 
-0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.001 
(0.20) 
Education 0.007 
(0.71) 
-0.029 
(1.22) 
0.005** 
(2.12) 
0.005 
(1.43) 
0.006** 
(2.27) 
-0.003 
(0.69) 
Age 0.274 
(0.93) 
-0.444 
(0.81) 
0.011 
(0.18) 
-0.243** 
(2.48) 
0.023 
(0.35) 
-0.194* 
(1.73) 
Age squared -0.004 
(0.88) 
0.007 
(0.82) 
-0.000 
(0.23) 
0.004** 
(2.49) 
-0.000 
(0.37) 
0.003 
(1.63) 
Work experience 0.009 
(0.98) 
0.028** 
(2.52) 
0.006*** 
(3.59 
0.001  
(0.40) 
0.006*** 
(3.23) 
0.020*** 
(7.69) 
White -0.108* 
(1.99) 
-0.113 
(0.91) 
0.020 
(1.63) 
-0.013 
(0.70) 
0.007 
(0.52) 
-0.069*** 
(3.39) 
Married 0.015 
(0.21) 
-0.182 
(1.45) 
-0.003 
(0.14) 
-0.085*** 
(4.20) 
0.011 
(0.60) 
-0.140*** 
(6.28) 
Number of kids 0.020 
(0.60) 
-0.094* 
(1.67) 
0.011 
(1.47) 
-0.011 
(1.09) 
0.009 
(1.10) 
-0.025** 
(2.08) 
Presence of a kid aged under 6 0.157 
(1.55) 
-0.113 
(0.59) 
0.039* 
(1.66) 
-0.045 
(1.34) 
0.049** 
(2.02) 
-0.147*** 
(4.19) 
Presence of a kid aged 7-12 0.205 
(1.31) 
0.465* 
(1.89) 
0.007 
(0.21) 
-0.073* 
(1.70) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
0.103** 
(2.20) 
Health problem -0.154 
(1.09) 
0.246 
(1.18) 
-0.168*** 
(2.96) 
0.194*** 
(4.23) 
-0.093** 
(2.39) 
0.069 
(1.50) 
Mother education 0.013 
(1.34) 
-0.002 
(0.13) 
-0.001 
(0.48) 
-0.003 
(0.90) 
0.003 
(1.23) 
-0.003 
(0.96) 
Father education 0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.46) 
0.002 
(0.74) 
-0.000 
(0.26) 
-0.005* 
(1.74) 
Urban -0.048 
(0.71) 
0.026 
(0.19) 
-0.005 
(0.34) 
-0.040* 
(1.75) 
-0.021 
(1.34) 
-0.019 
(0.73) 
Heckman’s selection -1.396 
(1.46) 
1.514 
(0.53) 
0.199 
(0.62) 
-2.830*** 
(7.12) 
-0.825*** 
(2.75) 
-0.491 
(1.50) 
R2 0.153 0.201 0.059 0.223 0.063 0.175 
N 277 221 1629 1488 1906 1709 
Note: Four regions are controlled. t-statistics are in parentheses. */**/*** refer significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1%.   
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